The Sanctions-Locked Aviation Market

By Alex Kulinsky, May 2026

For Airbus, Boeing, engine OEMs, lessors, MRO providers and parts suppliers, most growth forecasts focus on India, China, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North America. These are visible markets: large populations, growing middle classes, rising passenger demand and active aircraft orders. But there is another aviation market that is far less visible because it is politically frozen rather than commercially absent.

That market sits inside sanctioned or semi-isolated countries such as Iran and Russia.

Today, these markets are largely closed to Western aircraft manufacturers, lessors, engine suppliers, avionics companies and certified MRO networks. Yet the underlying aviation demand has not disappeared. People still need to travel. Airlines still need capacity. Aircraft still age. Engines still require maintenance. Landing gears still reach overhaul limits. Structural inspections still become due. The commercial need remains; only the legal and political ability to serve it has been restricted.

If sanctions were lifted, reduced or selectively modified within the next five years, the result would not simply be a few symbolic aircraft orders. It could create a major wave of fleet renewal, used aircraft demand, spare parts sales, engine support, technical records work, MRO expansion and aviation financing activity. In some ways, these countries represent a compressed aftermarket and fleet-renewal cycle waiting to be released.

This does not mean that sanctions will be lifted. Nor does it mean that Airbus, Boeing or any Western company could act without strict legal approvals. Aviation is one of the most compliance-sensitive industries in the world. Aircraft, engines, avionics, navigation systems and certain software may fall under export-control regimes. Any future re-entry into Iran, Russia or similar markets would depend on government policy, licensing, end-use restrictions, insurance, financing and international regulatory acceptance.

However, as a business question, the potential is significant: if these markets reopen, what would it mean?

A Market Hidden by Politics, Not by Lack of Demand

Aviation demand is usually driven by population size, geography, income growth, tourism, trade, diaspora links and the availability of safe, affordable air transport. Iran and Russia both have several of these drivers.

Iran has a population of more than 80 million, a large domestic market, a strategic location between Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia, and a long history of civil aviation. Russia is geographically enormous, spanning 11 time zones, where air transport is not a luxury but an infrastructure necessity. For many remote cities and regions, aviation is the only realistic way to maintain passenger and cargo connectivity.

The problem is not that these countries lack aviation demand. The problem is that sanctions have interrupted the normal aircraft lifecycle. In normal markets, airlines renew fleets gradually. Older aircraft are retired, replaced, parted out or converted. New aircraft enter service with warranty support, training, technical documentation and OEM-backed maintenance. Engines move through approved shop visits. Parts flow through traceable distribution channels. Lessors provide financing and asset mobility.

Sanctions break this cycle.

They force operators to keep aircraft longer, rely on alternative procurement channels, use older technology, reduce fleet flexibility and operate with limited access to OEM support. Over time, this creates a gap between what the market needs and what it is legally able to buy. The longer the gap remains, the larger the replacement requirement becomes.

That is why a future reopening would not be a normal sales campaign. It would be a catch-up cycle.

Iran: The Original Fleet Renewal Opportunity

Iran is the clearest example of a market where the commercial opportunity was already visible before sanctions returned.

After the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran began to re-enter the international aviation market. Airbus announced in January 2016 that Iran Air had signed an agreement for 118 aircraft, including A320 family aircraft, A330s, A350s and A380s. Airbus described the agreement as part of a broader modernization package covering pilot and maintenance training, airport operations, air traffic management and regulatory harmonization.

Later in 2016, Airbus and Iran Air signed a firm contract for 100 aircraft: 46 A320 family aircraft, 38 A330 family aircraft and 16 A350 XWB aircraft. Airbus stated that the deal was subject to U.S. OFAC export licenses because Airbus aircraft contain U.S.-origin technology above the relevant threshold.

Boeing also had a major opportunity. In 2016, U.S. approval was reported for Boeing to sell 80 commercial aircraft to Iran Air, under strict conditions that the aircraft be used only for commercial passenger operations and not transferred to designated entities.

Then the window closed. In 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions. OFAC stated that November 5, 2018 marked the full re-imposition of sanctions lifted under the JCPOA, including actions against hundreds of individuals, entities, aircraft and vessels. The Treasury also revoked Iran-related General License I, which had authorized certain exports of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services.

This history matters because it proves the market was not theoretical. Iran had already generated large aircraft commitments when sanctions relief was available. The country did not need to be convinced that it required fleet renewal. It had already started the process.

If sanctions were lifted again, the first question would not be whether Iranian airlines need aircraft. The question would be how quickly they could finance, certify, insure, import and operate them.

Russia: A Much Larger but More Complicated Case

Russia is different from Iran. Iran’s civil aviation sector has been constrained for decades and relies heavily on older aircraft. Russia, before 2022, was deeply integrated into the global aviation system. Russian airlines operated large numbers of Airbus and Boeing aircraft, many of them leased from international lessors, maintained through global supply chains and supported by Western OEMs.

That changed after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Western sanctions blocked new aircraft exports, spare parts, maintenance support, leasing and insurance services. EU sanctions required lessors to terminate affected aircraft leases into Russia by March 28, 2022. Boeing and Airbus aircraft operating in Russia became isolated from normal OEM support channels.

Reuters reported in 2025 that Russia had asked ICAO to ease sanctions, arguing that restrictions on spare parts and related services affected the safe operation of more than 700 aircraft, mostly Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Reuters also reported that Russia’s attempt to replace Western aircraft with domestic aircraft has faced serious industrial problems: only one of 15 planned commercial aircraft had reportedly been delivered in 2025, while projects such as the MC-21 and Superjet have faced repeated delays and performance challenges linked to import substitution.

This makes Russia a potentially huge but legally, financially and politically difficult market.

If sanctions were lifted, Airbus and Boeing would not simply restart sales as if nothing had happened. There would be major questions around ownership of aircraft retained in Russia, insurance claims, airworthiness records, lessor settlements, maintenance traceability, unauthorized parts, repairs performed without OEM support and the legal status of aircraft that were re-registered or operated outside their original lease terms.

In other words, Russia would not only be a sales opportunity. It would be a massive technical and legal cleanup project.

But that cleanup itself could become a market.

The First Wave: Safety, Records and Airworthiness Recovery

If restrictions were eased, the first commercial opportunity may not be new aircraft. It may be inspection, documentation and airworthiness recovery.

Aircraft that have operated for years under sanctions may need extensive technical review before they can be reintegrated into international operations, financing structures or insurance frameworks. This would include aircraft records audits, maintenance history reviews, AD and SB status checks, component traceability, engine LLP verification, repair mapping, modification reviews and confirmation of conformity with type-certificate requirements.

This is particularly important for Russian-operated Western aircraft. Even if the physical aircraft are still flying, international acceptance would depend on documentation and regulatory confidence. Lessors, insurers and foreign regulators would need to understand what happened during the sanctions period. Were parts installed from approved sources? Were repairs performed under acceptable approvals? Were engine life-limited parts tracked correctly? Were software updates, service bulletins and mandatory inspections applied? Are there gaps in the records?

This would create a large market for technical records specialists, independent inspectors, engineering consultancies, continuing airworthiness experts, MRO organizations and digital compliance platforms.

For Iran, the challenge would be slightly different. Many aircraft are older, and the focus would likely be on airworthiness assessment, fleet triage and deciding which aircraft are worth keeping. Some aircraft could be maintained temporarily; others would be candidates for retirement, teardown or replacement. The key would be deciding where scarce capital should go: heavy maintenance on old aircraft, leased used aircraft, or new aircraft orders.

The Second Wave: Spare Parts and Component Demand

The second wave would be spare parts.

When a market has been restricted for years, demand does not accumulate neatly like a normal order book. It accumulates as deferred maintenance, grounded aircraft, cannibalized components, short-life parts, outdated interiors, unreliable APUs, engines waiting for shop visits and aircraft flying with limited redundancy in spare inventories.

If sanctions are eased, airlines will not only order new aircraft. They will need immediate operational support for existing fleets. That means demand for rotables, consumables, expendables, avionics units, oxygen equipment, wheels and brakes, hydraulic components, fuel pumps, IDGs, starters, valves, actuators, APU parts, cabin equipment and structural repair material.

This could benefit OEMs, authorized distributors, independent parts traders and USM suppliers. But the market would be complex. Some parts may require export licenses. Some end users may remain sanctioned even if broader restrictions are relaxed. Some aircraft may be legally problematic because of ownership or insurance disputes. Some parts already installed on aircraft may lack acceptable traceability.

For parts suppliers, the opportunity would be large but not simple. The winners would be companies able to combine inventory availability with compliance discipline, documentation quality and fast technical screening.

The Third Wave: Engine MRO and Powerplant Support

Engine maintenance could be one of the biggest value pools.

Engines are expensive, technically complex and heavily dependent on OEM-approved parts, life-limited part tracking and specialized shop capacity. Years of restricted access to OEM support can create a backlog of engine work. Even where engines continue operating domestically, reintegration into the global system would require confidence in records, parts, repairs and operating history.

For Russia, this would be especially important because many Airbus and Boeing aircraft in the country use CFM, Pratt & Whitney, GE, Rolls-Royce or other Western-supported engines. For Iran, older fleets may include a mixture of mature engine types where parts availability, shop capability and LLP status are critical.

If sanctions were lifted, engine OEMs and MRO providers could see demand for inspections, restoration shop visits, LLP replacements, borescope campaigns, module repairs, spare engine leases, engine exchanges and long-term service agreements.

But capacity would be a constraint. The global engine MRO market is already under pressure due to high utilization, supply-chain delays and durability issues on some new-generation engines. Adding Russia and Iran back into the accessible market would increase demand further.

That could support pricing power for engine shops and engine lessors, but it could also make scheduling difficult for airlines in other regions. A reopening of sanctioned markets would not happen in isolation; it would compete with the existing global shortage of engines, parts and shop slots.

The Fourth Wave: New Aircraft Orders

The most visible opportunity would be new aircraft orders.

Airbus forecasts global demand for 43,420 new passenger and freighter aircraft over 2025–2044, including 34,250 single-aisle aircraft and 9,170 widebodies. Airbus also expects the global fleet to grow from 24,730 aircraft at the end of 2024 to 49,210 aircraft by 2044, with about 18,930 deliveries needed to replace older aircraft. Boeing’s 2025 Commercial Market Outlook similarly projects strong long-term demand, with passenger traffic more than doubling and emerging markets playing an outsized role.

Iran and Russia are not central to these public growth narratives because sanctions make demand difficult to convert into deliverable orders. But if they reopen, both countries would represent replacement-driven demand.

Iran would likely need a mix of narrowbodies for domestic and regional routes, widebodies for long-haul international service, regional aircraft for thinner routes and turboprops or smaller jets for secondary airports. The earlier Airbus package already showed demand across the full range, from A320 family aircraft to A330s and A350s.

Russia would need large numbers of narrowbodies to replace or supplement Airbus A320 family and Boeing 737 family aircraft, plus widebodies for long-haul routes and domestic trunk routes. However, Russia would also likely continue pushing domestic aircraft such as the MC-21 and Superjet for political and industrial reasons. Even if sanctions were lifted, Russian policy may not allow a simple return to full Western dependence.

This creates a realistic scenario: Boeing and Airbus might not regain the entire Russian market, but they could still capture specific segments where domestic aircraft cannot meet demand, performance, capacity, reliability or delivery timing.

Used Aircraft: The Faster Re-Entry Tool

Because Airbus and Boeing order books are already heavily backlogged, new aircraft deliveries would not solve everything quickly.

That makes used aircraft important. If Iran or Russia were allowed to re-enter Western aviation markets, the first capacity solution could come from used A320ceo, 737NG, A330ceo, 777, 787, A350 or regional aircraft, depending on sanctions terms and financing availability.

Used aircraft would be attractive for three reasons. First, they are available sooner than new aircraft. Second, they can be cheaper to acquire or lease. Third, they can be used as a bridge until new deliveries arrive.

However, used aircraft also require maintenance checks, records review, bridging checks, repainting, cabin reconfiguration, engine status review and landing gear status analysis. This would create demand for lessors, asset managers, technical consultants, transition MROs, CAMO-type services and records platforms.

In Iran, used aircraft could provide immediate renewal for ageing fleets. In Russia, used aircraft transactions would be more complicated because of unresolved lessor disputes and the status of aircraft already inside the country. Still, over a five-year horizon, used aircraft could become the practical first step before large new-aircraft deliveries.

MRO: The Real Long-Term Winner

Airbus projects that the global aviation services market will grow significantly, reaching an estimated USD 311 billion by 2044, supported by a global fleet expected to nearly double to more than 49,000 aircraft. If Iran and Russia were reintegrated, they would add not only aircraft demand but also services demand.

This is where the business case becomes broader than Airbus and Boeing.

Every aircraft requires line maintenance, base maintenance, component repair, engine support, landing gear overhaul, cabin work, modifications, software updates, technical publications, training, tooling and records management. Reopening sanctioned markets would create work for OEM services divisions, independent MROs, regional maintenance centers, training providers, parts distributors and engineering organizations.

For Iran, the opportunity would include rebuilding MRO capability to international standards, training technicians, modernizing maintenance planning, improving safety oversight and supporting new aircraft types.

For Russia, the opportunity would be more complicated but potentially larger: restoring support for hundreds of Western-built aircraft, auditing maintenance history, rebuilding trust with regulators and re-establishing supply chains.

In both cases, MRO would not be a secondary business. It would be the foundation of market re-entry.

The Risk: Not Every Aircraft Will Be Recoverable

A reopening scenario does not mean every aircraft currently operating in sanctioned markets becomes internationally acceptable again.

Some aircraft may have incomplete records. Some may have parts with questionable traceability. Some may have repairs that require reinspection or rework. Some may be too old or too expensive to bring back to international standards. Some may be commercially obsolete even if technically repairable.

This creates a triage market. Aircraft would need to be classified into categories:

1. Aircraft suitable for continued operation with limited work.
2. Aircraft requiring heavy maintenance or major records reconstruction.
3. Aircraft suitable only for domestic operation.
4. Aircraft better suited for teardown and parts recovery.
5. Aircraft economically beyond recovery.

This process would create opportunities for technical advisors, appraisers, lessors, insurers, legal teams, MROs and parts traders. It would also create risks for buyers who underestimate documentation problems.

What It Would Mean for Airbus and Boeing

For Airbus and Boeing, a sanctions-lift scenario would mean more than aircraft sales.

First, it would expand the replacement market. Both Iran and Russia have fleets that require modernization. Second, it would increase demand for customer support, technical publications, training, flight operations support and spares. Third, it could create opportunities for services contracts, fleet planning advisory, MRO partnerships and digital maintenance platforms.

Fourth, it could strengthen the aftermarket. Aircraft sales are high-value, but the lifecycle value of spares, repairs, modifications, training and technical support can be enormous. In markets that have been undersupplied for years, aftermarket demand may appear immediately.

However, Boeing and Airbus would also face difficult decisions. Re-entering these markets would involve reputational risk, export-control risk, political risk and payment risk. Financing would be a major challenge because Western banks and lessors would need clear legal protections. Insurers would need confidence that aircraft could be repossessed, maintained and operated under internationally recognized rules.

For Iran, the key question would be whether a new political agreement provides durable sanctions relief. No manufacturer wants to restart deliveries only to see licenses revoked again.

For Russia, the challenge would be even greater. The industry would need to resolve the legal consequences of aircraft retained after 2022, the status of lessor claims, and the reliability of future contractual enforcement.

What It Would Mean for Airlines Outside Iran and Russia

A reopening could also affect airlines outside the sanctioned countries.

If Iran and Russia suddenly gain access to aircraft, parts and MRO capacity, they will compete with existing airlines for scarce resources. Airbus and Boeing are already managing large backlogs. Engine MRO capacity is already tight. Used aircraft supply is limited because many airlines are extending the life of older aircraft due to delivery delays.

Therefore, the reopening of Iran and Russia could increase competition for aircraft slots, used aircraft, engines, landing gears, APUs and technical labor. It could support asset values and lease rates. It could also create stronger demand for older-generation aircraft that would otherwise be retired.

For lessors and parts traders, this would be positive. For airlines looking for cheap used aircraft or fast shop slots, it could be negative.

A Five-Year Scenario

If sanctions are eased within the next five years, the likely sequence could look like this:

Year one would focus on legal approvals, licensing, aircraft audits, records recovery, limited spare parts supply and humanitarian or safety-related aviation support.

Years two and three would likely bring used aircraft leases, engine shop visits, MRO contracts, training programs, component support and selective fleet restoration.

Years three to five could bring new aircraft orders, delivery slot negotiations, local MRO partnerships, financing structures and broader fleet planning.

The total opportunity could be measured not only in aircraft orders but across the full lifecycle: aircraft, engines, spare parts, MRO, training, technical records, airport systems and air traffic management. Iran’s earlier Airbus and Boeing discussions already pointed to well over 100 aircraft from Airbus alone and major Boeing interest. Russia’s current reliance on hundreds of Western-built aircraft suggests a much larger technical and replacement requirement, although political and legal barriers would be much more complex.

Conclusion: A Frozen Market With Real Commercial Weight

Iran and Russia show how sanctions can hide aviation demand without eliminating it.

Aircraft still age. Passengers still travel. Airlines still need capacity. Engines still need shop visits. Parts still wear out. Maintenance still becomes due. The market does not disappear; it becomes trapped.

If sanctions are lifted or meaningfully relaxed within the next five years, Airbus, Boeing and the wider aerospace ecosystem could face a major reopening opportunity. The first beneficiaries may not be aircraft sales teams, but technical records specialists, MRO providers, engine shops, parts suppliers and compliance experts. New aircraft orders would follow, but only after legal, financial and airworthiness foundations are rebuilt.

For Airbus and Boeing, Iran could represent a repeat of the 2016 fleet-renewal opportunity. Russia could represent something larger but much more difficult: a combination of fleet replacement, technical recovery, legal settlement and strategic re-entry.

The hidden market is real. The question is not whether aviation demand exists in these countries. It does. The question is whether politics, law, financing and compliance will ever allow that demand to become a normal commercial market again.

If that happens, the impact would not be limited to Tehran or Moscow. It would be felt across aircraft order books, used aircraft values, engine MRO capacity, spare parts pricing and global fleet planning.

In a supply-constrained aviation world, reopening even one large sanctioned market could change the economics of the entire aftermarket.

© 2026 Millhouse Consulting Kulinský / Alexandr Kulinsky. All rights reserved.

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